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Session 5B
SIMON HOLZER: In the next few minutes, I would like to express my
views on some recent developments in Swiss patent law, in particular the
importance of some procedural provisions for Swiss patent disputes. For short
background information, Switzerland has a typical continental European code of
civil procedure. This means that litigation in general and also patent infringement
cases are very much front-loaded. “Front-loaded” in this case means that the parties
must assert and introduce their positions and evidence early in the proceedings
since amendments later in the proceedings may be difficult or even impossible.
Additionally, in Swiss patent disputes a so-called judge-rapporteur is
appointed. Normally, this is a judge with a suitable scientific background, and
usually, after a double exchange of briefs by the parties, the so-called judgerapporteur presents his preliminary opinion of the case to the parties. It is obvious
that both parties may have an interest in supplementing or amending their position
after receiving this preliminary opinion of the judge-rapporteur. Patentee, this is
obvious, may be interested in amending his patents, if for example, the judgerapporteur is of the non-binding view that the asserted patent lacks novelty or
inventive step.
In practice, the possibilities of a patent owner to amend his patent after
having received a written preliminary opinion of the judge-rapporteur after the
second exchange of briefs have been increasingly restricted in Switzerland in recent
years, and I will explain it in more detail. In the first ruling of August 6, 2019, the
Swiss Federal Patent Court held that the patent owner could amend his patents,
without any restrictions, only in his statement of claim or in the reply brief. 1 Further,
the court concluded that if a defendant files new invalidity arguments or prior art,
only for the first time in his rejoinder, then the patent owner may react to this by
amending his patents — but only within a very short period of approximately 10
days. This means that the patentee is usually not allowed and not in a position to
base his infringement claim on a new version of his patent as a reaction to the judgerapporteur's preliminary assessment.
In a second ruling2 of August 19, 2020, last year, the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court had to deal with the following constellation: Again, the judge-rapporteur
issued a preliminary written opinion after the double exchange of briefs and
considered the patent in suit to be novel and inventive but invalid due to added
subject-matter. Since in light of the mentioned case law of the Supreme Court, the
patent owner could not amend his patent at this stage with inter partes effect
anymore. However, he went to the Patent Office and asked for an amendment of
his patent from the Swiss Patent Office. The Swiss Patent Office granted the
amended version of the assorted patent, and the patent owner then filed this new
version in the pending patent-infringement proceedings and argued that the
amended patent was a new fact that had come into existence only now — i.e., only
recently — and litigation based on the amended patent must therefore be
admissible. Because of an exemption under Swiss procedural law, the filing of new
facts after the double exchange of briefs is still possible if those facts came into
existence only after the second brief.
1
2
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A majority of the panel of judges of the Federal Patent Court concluded that
the infringement proceedings should continue with the amended version of this
patent. However, this was the first decision by the Federal Patent Court in
Switzerland that included a dissenting opinion from two of the five judges. The
minority was of the opinion that the newly amended patent was not a genuine new
fact since the patentee could determine the timing of the amendment and could have
asked for such amendment earlier. Therefore, it was no surprise that the case was
appealed to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court then
concluded that the patent owner knew of the alleged added-matter issue and
asserted violation of Article 123(2) of the European Patent Convention, 3 at the
latest, when reading the defendant's rejoinder and could and should therefore have
amended his patent as a direct reaction to that rejoinder at that time. This means
much earlier, and not only after the preliminary opinion of the judge-rapporteur.
Since the patent as granted no longer existed due to the amendment by the
Patent Office, and because the newly amended version of the patent could not be
introduced into the pending infringement case according to the Supreme Court, the
initial infringement proceedings then became groundless and had to be written off
without prejudice, according to the Federal Supreme Court. Therefore, the Federal
Supreme Court lifted the Federal Patent Court's decision and dismissed the case
without prejudice.
In my view, at least three key points can be taken from those cases by parties
engaged in Swiss patent litigation. First, in patent infringement proceedings in
Switzerland, as we learned, patent owners may amend their patents without
restrictions only in the statement of claim and in their reply. Second, after the
double exchange of briefs, a patent owner may amend his patent only if the
amendment is a direct reaction to and was caused by invalidity arguments newly
brought forward in the rejoinder of the defendant. The patent owner must
implement the necessary amendments immediately after having received the
rejoinder, and immediately means within approximately 10 days. If a patent owner
amends his patent with the Swiss patent office after the exchange of briefs, and his
amendment is not a direct and immediate reaction to new argument in the rejoinder,
he may not submit the newly amended patent in the pending proceedings. Since the
patent as granted no longer exists and the patentee cannot bring the new version
into the proceedings, the case normally ends without prejudice and the patentee
must bear the costs.
This rather strict approach of the Swiss courts with respect to amendments
of patents during pending litigation has been justified by efficiency considerations
by the courts. The courts normally state that it is important to avoid any delay of
pending patent proceedings. However, from my view, procedural rules that prevent
the patentee from amending his patent during litigation do not necessarily result in
swifter proceedings. To the contrary, sometimes patent owners, who know that they
will have only very few possibilities to fine-tune their patent claims if necessary,
tend to base their complaint on more auxiliary claims from the beginning. This is
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not efficient, in my view, if the parties have to deal with numerous (possibly
unnecessary) auxiliary claims very early in proceedings.
In addition, if a patent is amended with retrospective effect by the Patent
Office, and if this patent can no longer be brought into the proceedings for
procedural reasons, then the infringement case as we heard ends with a ruling
without prejudice according to Swiss law. This means that the patentee could
initiate new patent infringement proceedings to enforce the amended version of the
patent. Establishing new infringement proceedings is certainly not efficient
compared to an additional round of briefs in the initial patent dispute.
In my view, it will therefore be interesting to see whether the pendulum in
Swiss patent infringement cases will swing back again and whether future court
decisions in patent matters focus again on substantive patent law issues, rather than
on procedural questions like we saw in decisions of the past. Thanks.
MYLES JELF: Thank you very much, Simon. Thank you for stepping in to
save my embarrassment there as the technology interrupted at the very second I was
about to say hello to everybody. Before we jump into the question section, I'll just
stop the session by saying good morning to everybody. Well, good morning if
you're in the U.S. For those of us in Europe, good afternoon. For the truly
committed dialing in from Asia, good evening.
We've got some fantastic things in the session today. Simon is kicking us
off there with claim amendments during proceedings and we'll come back to the
discussion there in a second. We've also got a session on declaratory powers of the
courts concerning patents that don't actually exist and may never come to exist.
We've got the ambit of equivalents of claims, and whether a doctrine recurrence is
actually really needed. Lastly, we have possibly the golden-bullet topic for most
practitioners: how to actually impress a live patents judge. I'm looking forward to
that very much.
Just by way of housekeeping, to say as with the previous sessions, please
feel free to raise questions on the Q&A as we go along. If we have time, we'll try
and pull people up onto the stage to ask their question directly, but feel free to make
wider-ranging points as well in the Q&A, and we'll try and direct people to those
as we go along.
I missed introducing you, Simon. For those who don't know, I felt I should
just posthumously introduce you. Simon is talking there about a topic very close to
my own heart. Just by way, a very brief retrospective introduction, Simon is not
only a very experienced and capable patent litigator at the well-known Swiss firm,
Meyerlustenberger, but also very charming, and as I recall, a quite patient dinner
companion. I can say no higher praise often than that.
Jumping back then to what Simon was talking about substantively,
amendment during the course of proceedings — just by way of introduction to the
Q&A session on that, it sounds like Swiss law took a very similar path to that of
the UK. We used to have a system whereby there was very rarely ever any
amendment during litigation. That's because we had rules that as soon as you
wanted to amend the patent, you were required to explain when you first realized
that you were sitting on a bad monopoly — and people were not, generally
speaking, very happy to do that.
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The rules changed with EPC 2000, 4 and now we have a claim amendment.
But we've ended up in a very similar place to Switzerland, in that for proceduraleconomy reasons, there's a cutoff point where you can no longer, as the arguments
develop, keep putting in further iterations of the claims. That has led to a practice
that people put up front great ranges of what are effectively auxiliary requests,
conditional amendments, depending on if they're needed.
I'd be interested to hear from the members of the panel, in their various
systems, are those procedural-economy reasons. Do you see that you get
amendments or problems with amendments during the course of proceedings? Then
if anybody feels moved to speak on that from the panel, we can see who wants to
take the floor. Aloys?
ALOYS HÜTTERMAN: In Germany, as we all know, we have nullity suits,
but there, it is not easy to get an amendment, at least not when you are at the appeal
stage before the Federal Court of Justice, the Bundesgerichtshof. Here, we have
seen quite a few decisions, where the Bundesgerichtshof have made clear, it's at the
preliminary opinion of the Federal Patent Court — like in oppositions you get a
preliminary opinion — and then you have to react. If you don't, then you cannot do
that at a later stage. Or, if let's say your opinion is positive, and all of a sudden you
still lose your case, then you can do it when you file the appeal. But you have to
take the first chance to react. That goes for both sides; either you file a new request,
search for new evidence, or you file some more material. But here, procedural
economy is also very important.
MYLES JELF: I'll ask a quick question on this, do any of our systems allow
— it sounds like in the German system, you can file further claims after you find
out whether you won or lost. In the UK, you certainly can't do that. I was told quite
emphatically by the Court of Appeal that I was not allowed to do that. Sir Robin
Jacob, who may well be in the audience, was quite clear on the point. Waiting until
you find out what the court thinks and then amending is not allowed. Does
anywhere beyond Germany allow that post-finding amendment? Otto?
OTTO LICKS: In Brazil, it is codified that the patent owner will have the
right to offer amendments. We have no limitation on that statutory right, whether
it's in the trial or at the appeal stage. So it's codified to us that if there is patent
subject matter available; the patent owner is allowed to submit the amendments.
MYLES JELF: Very good. A final comment from Aloys, perhaps?
ALOYS HÜTTERMAN: Well, we do have a system like that at the EPO5,
of course. There, you can react once you have the Opposition Division's opinion,
but please keep in mind, it's always the opinion of the first instance. If the appeal
instance has a different view, then you may try to file something. Whether it's
allowed is a different issue.
MYLES JELF: A final from you, Otto, on that point.
OTTO LICKS: In validity litigation, the appellate courts have taken two
different approaches. Some appellate judges and panels will remand the case back
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to trial if they accept the amendments, and some will allow expert testimony at the
appellate stage and decide on appeal without remanding the case back to trial.
MYLES JELF: Very good. Well, I think here looking at the time, we'll move
on to our second talk now. There's a bit of a stream here, because we're going to
talk about divisionals, which are perhaps another way arguably of having a second
bite of the cherry. We move on to our second speaker, Marjan Noor. Again, a very
well-known figure to many of us, very experienced and capable patent litigator,
operating from an outfit called Allen & Overy in London, you may have heard of
them. Having a blue-chip life sciences practice there is second to none.
Marjan is going to talk to us today about divisional patent applications,
which in translation to the States, I think is probably a functional equivalent of a
continuation in part. In particular, Marjan will discuss whether having that
possibility of multiple divisional applications are the rightful friend of a patentee
who is looking to protect a genuine invention in a hostile world, or whether they
are more of the pernicious weed in the garden of IP about something that should be
done. Marjan, handing over to you.
MARJAN NOOR: Thank you. Yes, as Myles says so, I'll be speaking about
divisionals, and really divisionals if we take it from the perspective that they are a
legitimate tool in the patent system, for example, to overcome objections such as
the unity of invention requirement. Then it leaves the question, will they do cause
certain uncertainties?
They raise a number of uncertainties. One of the uncertainties is that you
don't know when they are going to be granted at all. In fact, you don't know whether
any are about to be filed and then granted. This is in the context of a competitive
product. Competitors have a situation where they can check to see whether any
have been filed, they won't know when they're going to be granted and they won't
know whether there are any submarine divisionals that may still be filed and then
granted.
The other uncertainty is that you also have an uncertainty as to the scope of
the divisional. The number of amendments, as we were talking about, can actually
be made during prosecution. At times, those amendments are timed or can take
place at a time when the patentee does have knowledge of the competitor's product.
So therefore, from the competitor's point of view, there won't be absolute certainty
as to what the claims of the divisional will look like and whether they will catch
their products.
Then also, a competitor that tries to seek to clear the way of the parent patent
obviously doesn't get certainty with respect to the divisional being an independent
patent right and also having potential differences to the parent pattern that catches
the competitor's products. Really with those issues in mind, you can either take the
approach, which I won't be dealing with in this talk, that it can fall into the ambit
of antitrust law, as to whether uses of divisionals in certain ways is anti-competitive.
Only last month, the European Commission started an investigation against Teva
with respect to its divisional practice. 6 But I won't be looking at it from that side,
6
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I'll be looking at it from the perspective of whether courts can show flexibility in
dealing with the uncertainties that are caused by divisionals.
Really, it's looking at it from two perspectives, two mechanisms that the UK
court has applied. One mechanism is what's called the Arrow declaration, which
has been around for a while, but was broadened last year. A second approach is
relying on the concept, the legal construct of issue estoppel, which was for the first
time a decision, which we acted on last year, used as a mechanism for achieving
certainty on divisionals.
Looking at the Arrow declaration first, this is really a concept where rather
than challenging the validity of a patent and they're all saying that you don't infringe
as a competitor, you're taking the shortcut, which is you're saying that a particular
product was obvious at a particular date. If that's the case, then either the patent
cannot be valid or your product doesn't infringe the patent, so it's that squeezed
shortcut.
Previously, an applicant would seek a declaration from the UK court that a
particular product is obvious or not new at the priority date. Up till last year, those
Arrow declarations were very specific to the product that the particular competitiveproduct company has. It was aligned effectively for what they wanted to get
freedom to operate on. Last year, in the Mexichem decision,7 the Court of Appeal
held that you do not need to be specific to a particular product. There's no reason
why a declaration can't go broader than that, it can actually cover an idea. In this
case, it was an idea that two particular refrigerants were obvious at a certain date.
Now, you have to meet the requirements of an Arrow declaration, which is
that it serves a useful purpose. In the case of divisional applications, the useful
purposes are that it allows the declarant or the applicant to actually achieve certainty
with respect to an idea such as the two refrigerants being obvious. Every patent that
may be granted on any divisional that covers that concept, that idea, will therefore
not be valid at least with respect to that idea. So it actually achieves certainty for
anything that has not been granted yet. Because those divisional applications are
not granted yet, there is no other statutory mechanism of getting certainty there.
The consequences of broadening the Arrow declaration are interesting not
only for generics and biosimilar products, but also for innovative biologics
products, which fall into the scope of a broader patent. That hasn't been tried, but
there's a potential for tying in a product, maintaining the fact that that product is
innovative, but still seeking an Arrow declaration with respect to the part that falls
within a previous patent application. We can discuss that a bit more later if needed,
if time allows. Those are arrow declarations for seeking certainty against an idea, a
process, or a product that falls potentially within a divisional application.
The other mechanism is relying on issue estoppel. This is a case where a
company has challenged a parent patent. In this case, Lilly had challenged the
Genentech parent patent, but a divisional of that patent proceeded to grant, and that
wasn't in the challenge. 8 What Lilly argued as a preliminary issue is that those issues
that overlapped between the parent patent and the divisional patent should estop
Genentech from defending those issues. It effectively transposed the judge's
7
8

Mexichem UK Ltd. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc. [2020] EWCA (Civ) 473 (Eng.).
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findings from the parent onto the divisional patent application. Then we argued that
the difference between the parent and the divisional was such, once those issues
were estopped from being argued, that there was no validity, and therefore, the
divisional patent should be held to be invalid through summary judgment.
In that case, it was the first time this has been done in the U.K., the judge
went through the various issues that were found in the first instance decision and
said that they formed the basis of the decision on the parent. Therefore, Genentech
was estopped from arguing them. What followed was that the divisional patent was
held to be invalid with respect to some of its claims. That's really a very streamlined,
quick way of relying on an earlier decision to tackle the uncertainty of a divisional
patent. That's all I was going to talk about. I'm happy to answer questions or discuss
it broadly now.
MYLES JELF: Aloys, you had a point to make?
ALOYS HÜTTERMAN: Well, actually, you asked me before if I wanted
to say something about the practice in Europe and where within Europe that's seen
as controversial or problematic, too. To be honest, I don't think so. It seems that the
fear of divisionals, similar to the possibility discussion we had a few years ago, is
another area where Europe sees things much more relaxed. I'm not aware of any
case in Germany where too many divisionals, or how divisionals were filed, ever
played a role. Klaus is in the audience, maybe you can correct me if I'm wrong.
MARJAN NOOR: Actually, I'll just chip in there because one of the things
I could have pointed out is, in Germany, the grant of the divisional very close to the
potential time for the competitors launch in a bifurcated system can cause
difficulties because the infringement action can be taken on the divisional patent,
and then there isn't yet the time for the validity decision to come before the
competitors launch. That is exactly, I think, in the bifurcated system where
divisionals can cause that sort of uncertainty for timings. But yes, whether there's
been a case or not is another matter.
ALOYS HÜTTERMAN: If I may add one sentence about EPO. At the EPO
we had a president, Ms. Brimelow, who a few years ago thought that the divisionals
were problematic, so we had a rule that you could not file them until the first patent
application was pending. Well, but then we had another President, Mr. Battistelli,
as you all know, and he thought that other things were more important, so Rule 36 9
was put back in its original form. What they did is they increased the fees for
second-, third-, and fourth-order divisionals and so on, which is a typical EPO
solution, I would say.
What's noteworthy is we have a pending case before the Enlarged Board of
Appeal about double patenting, whether it would be double patenting if identical
claims were pursued but with different application dates. So you have the priority
application and then the other application, and if identical claims can be granted for
both. We have to see what comes out of that. But overall, I would think that in
Europe and especially Germany, things are seen more relaxed.
MYLES JELF: Simon, observation from Switzerland?
SIMON HOLZER: Yes. When Marjan announced her topic, we also
exchanged some emails, and then the discussion was whether competition law
9
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could solve the problem. I read the press release, for example, of the European
Commission of March 4, 2021, where they announced that they have opened a
formal investigation against Teva for a potential abuse of divisional applications
and extending the scope of protection of the divisional applications. 10 I doubt that
the EU Commission has understood the effects of divisional applications. I also
doubt that competition law will provide legal certainty — what all the parties aim
and look for. I doubt that competition law proceedings would solve that problem.
MYLES JELF: It seems to me that's a bit like the rabbit hole we went down
with SPCs11 and market authorizations. With SPCs in particular, if it's a legal right,
you're entitled to apply for it. It's pretty difficult to say that you're acting abusively
in making those filings. Equally to me, it seems like divisionals were included in
the EPC to stop people filing three or four completely separate inventions and only
paying one fee, and they've become a completely different thing. They've become
a creature whereby you can keep trying to fine-tune the claims until you find the
one that sticks. Whether that's right or wrong is quite a different thing to what was
originally envisaged. Is this an Australian concept at all, Stephen, this idea of
having multiple go's at the panel?
STEPHEN BURLEY: Yes, I've been fascinated by this because it's really a
problem that's emerged in the context of what's soon going to be redundant, which
is an innovation-patent system that we have, which are smaller versions with shorter
terms. People would typically divide out claims after the proceedings have
commenced, and add a series which amounted to a thicket of patents with claims to
assert as they develop their infringement arguments. They have been the beginnings
of the odd issue of estoppel argument in that context. But in Australia, they're going
to abolish innovation patents fairly soon anyway, so I don't think we'll see it in that.
We'll see it for standard patents more likely. I think it's more of a problem in
Australia than it might be in the continental European countries. We're probably
similar to the position that Marjan was talking about.
RONALD E. DIMOCK: Myles, if I could just make one comment about
Canada.
MYLES JELF: Of course.
RONALD E. DIMOCK: In our patent quiver in Canada, we don't have an
Arrow. We do not have the same divisional practice that's in place in the United
States and elsewhere as Marjan described. The only way you can amend an issued
patent — you cannot do that during the course of the patent trial— you can only do
that in a reissue proceeding within four years of the grant12 or in a reexamination in
the patent office.13 Our practice in Canada is rather simple compared to what's been
described elsewhere.
MYLES JELF: Very good. I think there's quite a lot to be explored in that,
but we can perhaps come back to that in the general discussion at the end, if we
10
European Commission Press Release IP/21/1022, Antitrust: Commission opens formal
investigation into possible anticompetitive conduct of Teva in relation to a blockbuster multiple
sclerosis medicine (Mar. 4, 2021).
11
Supplementary protection certificate.
12
Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, s. 47 (Can.).
13
Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, s. 48 (Can.).
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have time. I'll move us on, looking at the clock, to our next speaker, who is the
Honorable Justice Stephen Burley, who has followed up a stellar career as an IP
barrister practicing in Australia before the Australian courts by becoming, himself,
a judge of the Federal Court of Australia. Stephen is today, hopefully, going to let
us peek behind the curtain, or under the bench — no, behind the curtain, with some
thoughts as to what happens in the courtroom that actually assists the woman or
man who's making the arbitration decision. Stephen, over to you.
STEPHEN BURLEY: Thank you, Fordham, for all of your contribution to
the event, which I find fascinating and wonderfully prepared and presented in this
difficult time. My confession for this presentation is that it's a bit of a poacherturned-gamekeeper situation. As Myles said, I was a barrister for quite a long time
and I've been a judge for about five years. I just wanted to share some observations,
which I've couched as 10 propositions as to the differences between the perspective
of the judge and the perspective, perhaps of the party, a barrister, an advocate, or a
trial lawyer.
The starting point is to remember that for the lawyers and the clients, the
trial is at the end of the process. Practitioners have engaged in deep preparation so
they are ready, and by the time the advocate stands up to present, everything about
the case is at their fingertips. Whereas for a judge, the work is at the back end, if
you like. The start of the process is the trial. Of course, you have the interlocutory
stages, but really, the beginning of the deep preparation is at the trial, and then it
goes into the judgment-writing process, which is a bit of a black box for many
people. That's a subject of another discussion, perhaps.
The propositions that I wanted to make, some of them will be obvious, and
perhaps some a little less obvious. The first point is: “in a patent trial, it's all about
the claims”. You're going to lose the case if you don't get the judge on side with the
specification and the claims. Sometimes, the central point as to the importance of
the claims gets lost in the welter of detail that's presented in a hearing. So in opening
and closing submissions and oral submissions, make sure that the construction
arguments are clear and are related to the grounds of invalidity.
The second point, I've called quirkily: “ignore the judicial omnipotence
assumption Part A.” The trial judge is unlikely to be across the detail of the case on
day one. You can assume the degree of knowledge about it is probably a result of
reading the opening submissions, and dipping into the patent. But experience tells
me that reading lengthy expert evidence, affidavits, or declarations at the outset is
unlikely to be of assistance because parties tend to give up arguments and abandon
witnesses in the middle of nowhere never to call them. So it's not an efficient use
of time as a judge to read all of the evidence before you sit on the bench. Don't be
too alarmed if the judge doesn't know everything. You can guarantee that at the
beginning of the case, the parties are going to know a lot more about it than the
judge.
The third proposition can be simply put: “patentee, don't be greedy.” It only
takes one valid claim to be infringed, so think carefully about suing on four patents
and 50 claims. It's true, of course, that as a matter of theory, the more claims and
the more patents, the better insurance there is against the successful invalidity
action. But in reality, when I see that sort of thing in the statement of claim when
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the case begins, I'm likely to assume that it's a dud infringement case or a bad patent.
Refine the infringement case to its most essential elements, or at least explain why
you've got so many.
The concomitant proposition for the defendant in a patent case is: “be bold.”
This applies to both clients and their lawyers. It's tempting to run a cross claim
relying on multiple prior art documents and multiple interlocking grounds of
invalidity. That temptation should be resisted. Too often, such cross claims are
simply cover for sloppy thinking and a failure to make good strategic decisions
about a grounds that are likely to fail. The harder the case, the fewer grounds should
be run because the more complex the case, the more likely the best arguments are
going to be lost in the noise. Clients can help here. Lawyers often include grounds
because they fear criticism for not throwing in the kitchen sink, just in case
something works. But as a result, we see cross claims covering multiple grounds
and we've all seen that happen. It's much better if some pruning is done and a wellinformed client can save costs and time by understanding the arguments, giving
clear instructions, and perhaps pushing back a little bit on the Hail Mary ground.
The next proposition is: “ignore the judicial omnipotence assumption Part
B.” Just because a judge asks a question during the course of argument, does not
mean that it's a loaded gun with the trigger being pulled. Quite often, though not
always, it's simply a question of innocent curiosity, or trying to clarify a proposition
put. Clients should not panic. We all remember, and I particularly remember,
people going into a huddle after a question is asked wondering what the tea leaves
mean. The judicial questions often reflect mere curiosity and an open mind, which
I'm told from time to time is a good thing for a judge to have.
The next proposition is: “with experts, it's all about trust and verification.”
Dealing with experts in complex patent cases is a bit like being a NATO weapons
inspector looking for signs of the development of weapons of mass destruction. I
find myself dipping from one area of complex technology to the other and I can't
confess to be across all of them. Certainly not enough for each case. I want an expert
of genuine expertise who's going to give frank evidence not tailored to suit his or
her client's case. If they're too polished or groomed, and I must say that those who
have given depositions in the United States tend to be quite groomed, I don't like
it. If it's too argumentative, I don't like it. If the expert overreaches their expertise,
I don't like it. You need to be careful to make sure that your expert is not an advocate
for your case but a genuine independent person who can assist. If you do that, then
that expert won't lose the trust of the judge. Once lost, it's difficult to regain. An
expert who's prepared to make sensible concessions and who gives clear opinion
supported by reasoning provides just the sort of verification needed.
The next proposition is: “experts unite and lawyers stay back.” Joint expert
reports prepared before the trial in the preparation of evidence can be very useful
indeed. It avoids the clutter of disagreement about semantics and enables them to
get ready to give evidence in a way which is actually dealing with the points in
dispute. We have in Australia the evocatively named “hot tub” for experts, where
they hop into the witness box at the same time and give evidence. During that, they
can ventilate their genuine disputes in discussion with each other and also be crossexamined. That's not to say that the client is abandoned. When they've got experts
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who actually have opinions which support the case, they'll be adhered to. But it
gives the judge a good chance to see genuine interaction and dispute.
Next point is: “ignore the judicial omnipotence assumption Part C.” Don't
assume that the judge understands when you've delivered a killer blow to an expert
or another witness during the course of oral evidence. No matter how well-prepared
you are as a judge, it's going to be necessary for lawyers to explain and repeat,
preferably several times, what your best point was. For lawyers and everyone who's
deeply enmeshed in the case, a "yes" answer to a simply put casual question in
cross-examination can mean to them the game is up. But it may not be so obvious
to the judge, particularly where both sides keep a poker face. So tell and retell the
best points.
Related to that is the ninth point — we're getting to the end, I promise —
“simplify, explain and expand.” Oral and written submissions should go together.
Aim to clarify and explain interrelationships between construction, infringement,
and validity grounds — oral submissions can never do the detail. You need the
written submissions to do that. But they should be interrelated and cross-referenced
to each other, emphasizing the best points orally and explaining them. Nothing's
worse than a transcript that does not link the argument with the ground and the
evidence. Structure is everything.
My final point is: “a plague on patent trials?” This really arises in the
context, of course, of COVID-19. It hasn't meant the end of oral hearings. In fact, I
think they've been enhanced by the opportunity to use video technology, and at the
same time, demonstrate the ability for people to come together very quickly. It's
fantastic technology. I love it, and as an IP lawyer, I think it's wonderful how the
world has stepped up to this.
Two further points to make: first, the use of the video technology such as
we're seeing today enhances transparency and access to justice. Overseas clients
can watch trials in Australia if they want to stay up all night, and busy witnesses
can be beamed in from all over the world to give evidence. They can be crossexamined. It's a great surrogate. Secondly, video-conducted hearings are not the
best way to conduct a trial. There's nothing like in-person hearings for bringing
together the importance of the judicial institution and having people in the same
room to be able to hear the process. That's a subject in itself that could occupy
another seven minutes or seven hours, and no doubt, it will in due course. In-person
hearings still have many advantages. But I suspect I'm probably close to finishing
my time, so I'll finish there.
MYLES JELF: Thank you so much, Stephen. I feel that's very brave of you
in a way to put yourself in the lion's den here, amongst all these practitioners,
especially now we got to the Q&A bit of the exercise.
I suspect we're having a number of questions. One point that occurred to me
as you were talking: you were properly highlighting the importance in our system,
which is true of the UK system as well as many of the common-law systems, about
live testimony from technical expert witnesses. Obviously, many systems around
the world managed perfectly well without having that aspect. I think there's a
different mindset perhaps that the patent is primarily a legal document that should
be construed by the court as any other legal document. It might be like a statute or
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a contract and it's for the person drafting it to make it complete enough for that to
happen. I guess my question for you is, are there any times when you find that
approach might be attractive? When you think, "There's this great circus happening
all around me." Are there moments when you think, "I'd like to pack the circus up,
and just leave me with the documents and I'll get back to you?"
STEPHEN BURLEY: Certainly, I found that there's no shortage of detail in
patent cases, whether it's oral evidence or written evidence. Quite often, the written
evidence is elucidated by the oral. I think you do find the experts giving oral
evidence can sometimes just be unhelpful because they're not able to or prepared
to elucidate further. The process of cross-examination is designed to cut that down.
I can't say that uniformly, having oral evidence is of benefit. But generally,
I find that it breaks the body in terms of two experts with apparently equal expertise
having an opportunity, whether by traditional cross-examination, or in concurrent
evidence, to be able to explain their differences. Sometimes I wonder when it's all
a paper system, how the decision-maker is able to decide which is the preferable
view. That's really what I struggle with in non-oral hearing environments.
MYLES JELF: My observation is that expert evidence doesn't necessarily
play that much of a role in non-live testimony systems, because it just can't. You
have two pieces of paper, and who's to say which is right and which is wrong? Any
questions or observations from our panel there?
MARJAN NOOR: It's interesting because when the hot tub started in
Australia, there was thinking in the UK amongst practitioners whether that's
something that should be embraced because it cuts through the issues and gets to
the key points. One of the things which I also think is a symptom of the crossexamination is it sometimes becomes a battle as to not what are the correct views,
but who is the expert that seems more influential to the judge. The hot tub might
accentuate that even more. I wondered whether, in your experience, the hot tub
overall has been a good thing, or whether you'd reverse the plot?
STEPHEN BURLEY: I do think it's a good thing. I think there are two
components of the way we do the expert evidence. The first is the joint expert
report, which is the precursor to the hot tub. It involves the experts conferring
between themselves about their points of difference. That has had a very substantial
effect of refining the differences between the parties. We now have our court
registrars quarterback those sessions. They organize the conferences to take place.
They sit in on them, they make sure the experts follow the agenda, and they produce
a joint expert report. That's very valuable.
If you only had that, that's good refinement. Concurrent evidence does
depend on the personalities of the witnesses. I think the judge has a role to play in
that. In a way, it becomes more active for the judge. It also depends on the way the
practitioners handle it. Generally, we find the practitioners, as they've become more
used to the concurrent evidence, have become much more adept at handling it,
including working out how to do cross-examination within the confines of it.
But there is a risk that in the excitement of the adversarial environment of
the court, experts become a little bit more adversarial. Generally speaking, I find
that they have a disciplining effect on each other. One respected expert giving the
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evidence in a concurrent session with another expert, whom they respect, is less
likely to say completely silly things in order to win the case.
MYLES JELF: Aloys, I think you had a point that you were thinking to
raise?
ALOYS HÜTTERMAN: I come from a country where this is all very, very
different. Usually, if we have an oral hearing, then the judges know at least as much
about the case than any of the sides do — usually they are much better. Also, oral
hearings are very short. I think this is very effective. I think in the end, it's really
that you don't always need an expert to explain to you what you read in the patent.
If that's necessary, then in Germany the court can simply ask for an expert to come.
Although that is not very common. In my opinion — of course I'm biased because
I'm German — but I think the European, or let's say continental, way of having it
more as a written procedure is extremely efficient. I think it leads to excellent
results.
MYLES JELF: Well, that's the debate, I suppose. Sorry, Stephen?
STEPHEN BURLEY: I was going to say, certainly there are simple patents
which don't require experts, and there are many of those, but when you get into the
life sciences or areas of technology, then I think experts have a good way of...
ALOYS HÜTTERMAN: Well, also I think you should read some of the
rulings that Klaus writes where they don't need experts, and it's top-notch. So it's
also then up to the parties, in the written submissions, to really explain the situation,
and the scientific and technical backgrounds. That works pretty well, I think.
MYLES JELF: It's interesting, all of us practicing generally in these bigticket disputes, there are parallel litigation everywhere. But my observation, Aloys,
is that we regularly find that there are arguments you can run in Germany that you
can't run where you're going to have live testimony from an expert. I won't say
which is the better system or not, but it's an observation. A last word from Otto.
OTTO LICKS: Thank you, Myles. I'm coming from a country that has a
system of Napoleonic Code with the continental civil proceedings. I find the
description from Burley fascinating. I wish we had in our jurisdiction hot tubbing
and cross-examination. I think all legal systems try to do their best. They all try to
get the correct and fair result. In the written-based proceedings, you may not have
as many opportunities to bring evidence as you have in the common-law countries.
Certainly, I've seen opportunities in my jurisdiction where this type of oral evidence
could have cut down pages and pages of written opinions. Thank you.
MYLES JELF: Thank you very much. I'm conscious of the clock. We
should probably move on to our final speaker. Last, but by absolutely no means
least, we have Ron Dimock. He's a senior partner in the IP group Gowling's Toronto
office. Like me, Ron started off as an engineer and, like me, he then fell into bad
company. But he appears to have made the best of that though, having handled
perhaps more patent cases than any other lawyer in Canada, since those times.
We're very grateful today that Ron is going to talk to us about claim equivalents in
Canada, and whether the march towards a formal doctrine of equivalence is
something that is in fact needed at all. Ron, over to you.
RONALD E. DIMOCK: Thanks very much, Myles. Thank you, Fordham,
for allowing me this opportunity.
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My title is "What Keeps the Doctrine Away." That's the doctrine of
equivalents. In Canada, as in other jurisdictions, courts have tried to find the right
balance in construing patent claims to achieve two major objectives. Those
objectives are, first, for the inventors, to give a fair, time-limited monopoly to
encourage the disclosure of inventions. Second, for the public to have predictability
in knowing the scope of protection of the claims against infringement. For many in
the audience, the doctrine of equivalents is the applicable law. But not in Canada
— and it's for good reason. Nonetheless, Canada does have a law that gives a fair
and predictable interpretation of the claims. Moreover, it goes beyond just a simple
literal reading of the claims of the patent. With that out of the way, I will turn to
briefly review how we arrived at the current law in Canada.
The two-step approach was in vogue for most of the 20th century. The twostep approach consisted of first a literal or textual analysis of the claims, which is
the case around the world, to determine if the accused's device had literally taken
the invention exactly as described in the claims. But if no literal infringement was
found, the courts then went on to a second step: a substantive analysis of the
patented invention to determine whether in substance the accused device wrongly
appropriated the invention. In other words, infringement would occur if the accused
device took the pith and marrow, or the spirit of the patented invention, even if not
literally the claimed invention.
Going back to the imagery of the teeter-totter with the two-step approach.
On one side, there's literal infringement, which protected the strict textual literal
form of the invention. The literal analysis helped promote fairness and
predictability to the public. The counterweight to that, to the literal analysis, was
the substantive infringement analysis. As noted already, it protected not the literal
claimed invention, but rather the substance of the patented invention. This helped
address the problem created by the rigid textual analysis. As we know from around
the world, the doctrine of equivalents tries to resolve that. But back in earlier days
in Canada, it provided flexibility for the inventors to protect against interlopers
from the appropriation that otherwise would have taken the pith, marrow, and spirit
of the patented invention.
Now, the evolution toward the current law. We've had two, back-to-back
decisions at the turn of the millennium by our Supreme Court in Free World Trust
v. Électro Santé,14 and Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco,15 which adopted a one-step
purposive construction approach. That approach was described at length in the
Catnic Components case16 by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, and our
Supreme Court abandoned the two-step approach, which had been the law
previously.
So, purposive construction, what is it really? Claims are read in an informed
and purposive way, with a mind willing to understand, from reading the patent, how
the invention is intended to work. With this reading of the claims, the scope of the
claims can be broader than the literal meaning. With purposive construction,
elements of the claim will then be determined to be essential. That is, cannot be
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substituted without affecting the way in which the invention works. While others
in the claim may be held to be non-essential, the proverbial bells and whistles of a
claim that can be omitted, substituted, or varied without affecting the way in which
the invention works.
It boils down to being what is essential, and what is not essential. One
presumes at the starting point of the essentiality argument that all elements of the
claim are presumed to be essential. But that assumption is not immutable. It can be
displaced, and the onus is on the patentee to do so. According to the tests laid out
in these two cases in the Supreme Court of Canada, an element can be considered
to be non-essential if it has the following. Either on a purposive construction of the
words of the claim, the element was clearly not intended to be essential, or at the
date of the publication of the patent, the skilled person would have appreciated that
a particular element could be substituted without affecting the workings of the
invention as described in the patent.
So, there's one important point to be made here, which is that non-essential
is not the same as equivalent. Once relegated to the non-essential bucket, that
element no longer figures in the infringement analysis. The question for
infringement is not whether something in an accused device is equivalent to a nonessential element. That is, it matters not for a finding of infringement, that an
accused device has an equivalent of a non-essential element, but rather there is
infringement if the accused device takes all the essential elements, even if it omits
or varies a non-essential element. It's different, but I believe it leads to a fair
conclusion.
Now, earlier this morning there was a discussion about eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange,17 I should say, just like we do not have the Arrow situation in
Canada, we also don't have an eBay in Canada. In Canada, it is almost always the
case where a patentee has succeeded at trial, it will be awarded a permanent
injunction after trial. So, it's quite different than the case as described earlier today.
Regarding Justice Burley's comments about the use of experts, and in the COVID
world, I believe that we're going to adopt some of the practices that our Federal
Court has taken on during COVID even after it, like the use of technology we're
using here today to bring in fact witnesses from around the world that otherwise
would have had to travel to Canada to testify. I think there are some benefits to be
derived from this terrible pandemic otherwise, but that concludes my comments.
Thanks very much.
MYLES JELF: Thank you, very much Ron. We're running a little behind
the schedule, but just maybe one quick question. My question is from a UK
perspective. We for many, many years had a purposive construction approach and
then eschewed the doctrine of equivalence. Lord Hoffman, I think is in the
audience, who has been a largely a great architect of that purposive construction
approach.
Ultimately, the straw that broke Lord Neuberger's back, perhaps, with the
purposive construction approach was what do you do if you have something where
an integer of the claim is plainly not there? You have to construe something as
meaning the opposite of what it actually is in order to achieve a fair solution to the
17

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).

16

Session 5B
patency? The rod being a spring, or the potassium being construed as being sodium.
Have the Canadian courts had to grapple with those more graphic consequences of
purposive construction?
RONALD E. DIMOCK: There have been debates about whether we should
adopt the Actavis approach,18 which was prescribed by Lord Neuberger, which is
contrary to what was prescribed by Lord Lenny Hoffman in the earlier cases. We're
still debating that. For the moment, there seems to be a fairness approach taken by
the courts.
Where there is one problem, some counsel and parties forget to look at the
essentiality of a claim. So, there would be more claims succeeding on infringement
if you could prove that some of the elements are non-essential. That, I think, is
where we're going to be driving our law in the near future. Looking more at
essentiality as opposed to the doctrine of equivalents.
MYLES JELF: Well, thank you very much. Are there any further questions
in the panel? I think, looking at the clock. I think we started around ten minutes late
and we're finishing about eight minutes early, so I'm calling that on time. How do
we sound? Do we have time for further discussion, or should we wrap things there,
do you think?
MYLES JELF: Simon, you have a question?
SIMON HOLZER: Thanks, Myles. Coming back to Ron's presentation. I
would probably agree that omitting a feature is not the same as reading the feature
beyond the literal meaning of the feature. The Swiss view with respect to omitting
a feature or not having fulfilled a feature will probably be that the same
requirements apply as in prosecution proceedings, whether you can omit the feature
at all. Here, at the European Patent Office, we know that they gave up the nonessential test and it's merely a matter of original disclosure whether it is clearly and
unambiguously disclosed that there is a device or a process without that feature.
MYLES JELF: Thank you, Simon. Otto, you had a last question perhaps?
OTTO LICKS: What I would ask, coming from a country that has a
bifurcated system, is: if looking into those non-literal ways of finding infringement,
would it be different in a court that has both jurisdiction on the scope of the claim
for infringement and invalidity at the same time. Would it be a bit more limiting in
countries that have the bifurcated system?
MYLES JELF: This is a hot topic, I think? Marjan, go ahead.
MARJAN NOOR: Yes. It restrains you quite considerably if you're in a
non-bifurcated system because you always have to consider the impact of asking
those equivalents questions to the validity arguments that you're running.
Particularly, as reframed in the Actavis case, where it brings in the issue of whether
something is obvious to a skilled person. That makes the squeeze and the tension
even more difficult. I suppose, in a bifurcated system, which you would know
better, it's not like EPO. I assume at some point you have to have an eye on the fact
that if you're going to assert something in the context of the infringement system,
then that's going to tie you when the validity case comes along later or at the same
time, or separately. It's different in that sense to an EPO system where, unless
there's national proceedings ongoing, you have a bit more flexibility.
18
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MYLES JELF: I wonder whether Aloys has a viewpoint there? Of course,
my understanding is that the squeeze, or the equivalence is one of the rare aspects
where the infringement court in Germany has to give some thought to validity
through the Formstein defence. There's only so far you can run equivalence in the
infringement court.
ALOYS HÜTTERMAN: Well, I mean, in my experience and also, I've
heard a lecture from Professor Meier Beck some years ago when he was doing
patents, the Formstein defence, and anybody may correct me if I'm wrong, does not
play a role in practice at all. Because usually you would then simply have succeeded
in nullity. In the end, at the Bundesgerichtshof, it's where it all comes together, if,
of course, your revision is allowed.
Usually equivalence, and the question of where something is inventive or
not, in my opinion, it's like if you have an X and Y axis. Usually it's not the feature
where you can discuss whether X equivalently infringed, or not. It's not a feature,
where you say, "I can, it's that obvious over the prior art." It really depends on the
case.
On the other hand, in the German system, the courts are not isolated. Of
course they read what parties write in nullity suits, how they defend themselves,
and what they write in an infringement. If in one case you do it like that, and the
other, you do it like that, then that may not be the smartest way to proceed. The
court would likely have some questions for you.
MYLES JELF: Very good. I think, looking at the clock, we should probably
draw a line on the things there. I'll just thank all our panelists so much for
contributing their time and their thoughts today. I certainly enjoyed that session. I
hope everybody in the audience did. Thank you very much to you all, and I look
forward to catching up with you on the tables later on.
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